Space Force – Part 2

While reading through the National Defense Authorization Act for 2020, which is the act passed by Congress in December 2019 that establishes the United States Space Force, I was struck by how the legislation reads. It is surprisingly straightforward, and also incredibly amusing at times. There is a lot to be said about about legislation which I alluded to in the first post related to the Space Force. But, I will restrain myself here, focusing solely on how the pertinent information in the legislation compares to Space Policy Directive-4, which was discussed last week.

For those interested in reading along, the relevant part of the aforementioned act begins on p. 949 of the PDF linked above (which is p. 902 as labeled in the document.)

It is made immediately clear that the Space Force is, at its inception, is nothing special nor new. It is simply a redesignation of the preexisting Air Force Space Command. Anyone that the Secretary of the Air Force deems necessary (or sufficient?) for duty in the Space Force shall be assigned there from the Air Force. Additionally, no extra funding seems to be granted to the Space Force in this first run; everything is an administrative transfer of Air Force personnel to a new title under the Space Force. This goes all the way to all military and civilian employees of the Space Force being treated as if they were in the Air Force for the purpose of pay, benefits, and retirement.

All of this is in line with the Directive. A particular duty of the Space Force that is given the most attention is that of “acquisition”. There is to be a “Space Force Acquisition Council” whose express duty is to deal with any acquisition and integration of Air Force systems and programs into the Space Force. In other words, they are the migration assistant for this particular space-military upgrade. There is a list of the members of this council, the frequency with which they must meet (at least once a month) and write reports (each quarter until 2025). This, again, seems to be covering a relatively small point in the Directive: “…assume responsibilities for all major military space acquisition programs.”

However, things seem to depart after this. The scope of the Space Force is rather specific in the Directive, outlining how it relates to national intelligence and providing a set of priorities the Space Force should follow; in the legislative act, it is less specific, yet also seems to cover less. Here are the duties, as outlined in the act:

It shall be the duty of the Space Force to—

(1) protect the interests of the United States in space;

(2) deter aggression in, from, and to space; and

(3) conduct space operations.

National Defense Authorization Act

This broadly covers three of the six points listed in the Directive. Of course, that third point gives a lot of wiggle room. Yet, despite all that, there is one point in the Directive I think is sorely missing: “Developing, maintaining, and improving a community of professionals focused on the national security demands of the space domain.” I suppose such a duty could fall under point (1) above, yet I have my doubts that it will come to fruition.

Overall, this seems to be a slow start to things, but that is to be expected. A lot of official transfers of duties and completion of acquisition projects are slated for October 1, 2022, giving a bit over two and a half years from now for the Space Force to become more of its own entity outside of the Air Force from which it has been plucked. It’ll be interesting to keep track of what happens with it, and how much it enters the public consciousness. How long until we start seeing recruitment ads for the Space Force?

In the next (and probably final) part of this Space Force series, I plan to poke fun at the way legislation is written in general, using the 20 pages of legislation I read as a case study.

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